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The Competitive Implications of European Environmental
Regulation for Canada and the U.S.
Dale E. Stephenson *
have practiced U.S. environmental law for a decade, and during the
last four years, I have started work in the European context, principally
with European Community ("EC") matters and privatization issues in
Central and Eastern Europe. Consequently, I have developed a clear in-
sight and perspective into the parallels and differences between U.S. and
European practice over the past few years. There are certainly some eco-
nomic and competitive issues which are starting to affect the world mar-
ketplace and which are beginning to attract some attention.
As a general matter, it is important to consider the differences be-
tween the EC and the North American contexts. The EC has about 340
million people, about thirty-five percent more than are in the United
States, packed into a geographic area roughly a quarter of the size. Con-
sequently, Europeans view environmental issues a little bit differently
than Americans, and perhaps it is closer to home for them when contam-
ination goes out the smokestack or into the water.
I have also learned that each EC Member State has its own manner
of approaching environmental issues. Last year, for example, I met
with a European parliament member to discuss a waste disposal directive
that was being considered. In describing the views of Member States on
that directive, he stated:
Oh, you know how it is. The Germans say, "We already have this
under control; our technical people have solved the problem. Why
can't the rest of the world get on board with what we've already
achieved?" The Dutch will say, "We'll just add another tax, and no-
body will create the waste anymore." The Italians will say, "I think
we had that kind of waste once, but we lost it." The Greeks will say,
"What's the problem? What's the problem?" The English will mum-
ble, "Oh well, it's a situation that poses a serious, serious financial and
socioeconomic implication, and we simply must undertake a compre-
hensive impact analysis and background study before we'll even take
any more thought on the matter."
As a background for the topic today, it is important to look at how
the systems of environmental regulation have developed in the United
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States and the EC. While the United States has been regarded as the
model for environmental development for the past quarter century, there
are some important differences that are beginning to emerge in the EC.
Environmental regulation in the United States, until about a quarter
century ago, constituted primarily public nuisance law and enforcement
under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. Some state water agencies
and air agencies began to emerge in the 1950s and 1960s, but it really was
not until about 1968 or 1969 that a true environmental program began to
develop.
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") was created in
1970, and it began by adopting laws, regulations and other materials.
The first Clean Air Act was passed in 1970 and consumed a total of forty
typed pages. It was a pretty concise document that people could live and
work with, which has since gone through several amendments. In the
1990 Amendment, the Act blossomed to 740 pages with all kinds of de-
tailed regulations and materials.
It is fair to say that the EC is on the front end of that development
curve. Some of its major liability directives and materials are quite short.
The one that has probably brought the most heartburn to multinational
businessmen is the directive for civil liability for waste, which is in some
ways comparable to our Superfund statute. The EC directive comprises
a total of five pages. It says what it says, but does not go into minute
regulation of the details.
The aggregate cost to society of environmental programs in the
United States, given studies put together by EPA and some private foun-
dations, is now about $90 billion a year, and I think this is a pretty fair
number. Due to the new Clean Air Act and some other things that are
coming through, the cost is projected to be about $155 billion by the year
2000. Think about that in terms of what the U.S. generates. That is
about two to three percent of our gross national product - about half of
the Defense Department's budget. For comparison, in Europe, probably
only the Germans and the Austrians (who are not yet members of the
EC) have spending levels in that range.
Over the last fifteen years, U.S. government-directed environmental
expenditures have increased from about $500 per household to about
$1500 per household. That accounts for about one percent of our gross
national product. Industry, other kinds of market losses, things like the
CERCLA program, liability programs and banking impacts from our en-
vironmental scheme account for the remaining 1.7 percent. On balance,
the government through taxes pays for about forty percent of the envi-
ronmental program, while industry picks up the other sixty percent.
That is the kind of economic scheme our regulations have created in the
United States.
Clearly, the political media focus is drawn to liability schemes like
CERCLA to put liability on faceless corporations, pretending that some-
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body else is going to pick up the tab. These schemes make industry pay
virtually all of the costs. In statutes like the new Clean Air Act Amend-
ments, there has been a general withdrawal of tax-based funding for gov-
ernmental programs away from the focus which prevailed in the early
days of environmental regulation. For example, the Clean Water Act for
sewage treatment plants across the country was initially financed with
ninety percent federal money and then fifty percent federal money. Most
of that money is going or has gone away.
The EC's 340 million people across twelve Member States began
creating joint economic cooperation in 1957 when they drafted the
Treaty of Rome. The Treaty of Rome said nothing about environmental
regulation or controls; it said that the Member States were going to have
some common economic goals and were going to take out certain kinds
of barriers to facilitate trade with each other. That scheme was created
so that regulations or directives could be adopted, and unanimity was
required for most determinations.
Some environmental directives did come out in the early days in
response to disasters, primarily the Sevaso dioxin incident and things like
that. Such directives always cut back to the lowest denominator, because
any one of the Member States - whether the United Kingdom, Spain,
Portugal or Greece - could always reject it saying, "That's too expen-
sive for my country."
That all changed in 1986 when the EC adopted the Single European
Act, which created the so-called 1992 program of economic integration.
For the first time, the EC created an article (Article 130S) with an ex-
press environmental platform. That platform still required unanimity to
get anything pushed through, so the EC got a little more creative. It
went back and looked at the fair trade or economic integration provision
of the Single European Act. In order to make 1992 a reality, for things
that were required for fair trade or economic integration, it allowed a
qualified majority to pass on the directives. No longer could one, two or
even three Member States reject the proposal. Upon a challenge, the
Court of Justice held that the environmental standards are essential to
economic integration and that they could be adopted by a qualified
majority.
This is where the EC is right now. We have seen a big thrust of
environmental directives. Directives are adopted by the Community,
and then Member States have a year and a half or two years to pass
enabling legislation at the state level to implement them. A few things
pass directly as regulations, which are immediately applicable, but pri-
marily, the kind of authority exercised by the EC today is different from
the type of national authority we have in Washington, D.C. The EC
system is much more diversified. Also, there is now no effective common
enforcement authority to govern all of those things at the European level.
The mentality of the Green Party involved in the political process is
also a distinct feature of the EC. The Greens are fairly well infused polit-
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ically, and they started throwing back things to make directives much
more environmentally aggressive. Directives that are being adopted are
going to need a couple years to come into place. By and large, the EC is
now five to ten years behind the U.S. and Canada in terms of the strength
of its program, but it is coming along rapidly. I think almost forty per-
cent of the directives required to achieve EC 1992 are environmental di-
rectives, indicating how important the environmental criteria and
standards are to integrating the EC.
A tremendous difference in environmental philosophy exists in the
EC today, usually viewed along North-South lines. Germany and the
Netherlands are environmentally progressive. They have standards that
are essentially similar to or exceed the standards that we have in the
United States and Canada. Countries in the southern realm of Europe -
particularly Greece, Spain and Portugal - are on the low end of the
environmental regulation spectrum. France, the United Kingdom and
Belgium are nations in the middle of this spectrum - industrialized
countries that are starting to get more green in their philosophy now that
it is an emerging political view within their own areas.
The Single European Act picked a high level of environmental pro-
tection as its standard.
According to the EC Environment Commissioner, the EC has now
reached a phase where the environment and the internal market are on
equal footing. The new two-stage standards in the program for foundries
is an example. It will allow Germany and the Netherlands to plan ahead
for more stringent regulation, and will allow countries like Greece, Spain
and Portugal, that do not have the same kind of resources, to maintain a
lower standard to keep from driving their economies down.
There are a couple of other areas in Europe you must keep in mind.
For one, there is the European Free Trade Association ("EFTA"), com-
prised of seven countries, including Austria, Sweden and some others like
that. Austria and Sweden have now applied for this EC membership.
We also have the East or Central European countries that are beginning
to fold into the economic picture in Europe. Czechoslovakia, Hungary
and Poland are all seeking to join the EC when they can come up to
those standards, and further off to the East we have former Soviet Union
territories with tremendous populations and resources that will or may
well get into this economic picture.
EFTA traditionally has sought to have environmental considera-
tions pushed within the free trade structure of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). The EC wants to do those things on its
own internally, and there is a turf battle going on right now. From
across the Atlantic, it appears that the EC is attempting to make itself a
much more competitive place with respect to the environment than we in
the United States have managed to be.
I noticed in preparation for the United Nations Conference on Envi-
Vol. 18:101 1992
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ronmental Development that was held in Rio de Janeiro this June, where
we compared environmental and economic issues in many countries, the
Industrial Chamber of Commerce issued this statement which I think
fairly accurately describes the big picture:
Until recently most policy makers treated environment and economic
development as separate paths. However, the complex interconnec-
tions between environment and economics, essentially a seemingly sim-
ple decision, may create far reaching and unexpected repercussions.
Economic policy, which does not take environmental considerations
into account, can certainly cause environmental damage, but environ-
mental policy, which has more economic considerations, has the po-
tential to distort and disrupt economic conditions nationally and
internationally to aggravate existing conditions of poverty to delay the
effect of importation of the most urgent environmental protection
measures.
Finally, we are starting to look at the balance between economics in
emerging nations and advanced nations and environmental considera-
tions in one big picture, in which the United Nations is becoming quite a
driving force. I think that perhaps the United Nations wants to take this
as their next big policy issue to advance the cause of worldwide
integration.
What is the bottom line on all this? There are perhaps more emerg-
ing questions than definite answers right now. What environmental is-
sues significantly affect economics in the world picture? How much will
new programs cost now, and how much will they cost in the future?
Who is going to pay for them - the government or the private sector?
What does the investment buy you in terms of real environmental protec-
tion? Who sets the standard for what you are going to have? Finally,
who can force you to pay for it? Are there going to be direct enforce-
ment programs, or indirect influence through consumer choices?
Also, in terms of liability schemes being developed, can I reasonably
predict or plan what that liability scheme is going to do for me? Can I
get insurance for it? How much will it cost me now and in the future?
Who can force me to pay for it - government enforcement, citizen suits,
who?
Right now, there is a big discrepancy between the EC generally,
with the exceptions of Germany and the Netherlands, and the United
States in terms of the amount of money spent on environmental regula-
tions. For example, I think Italy spends about .25 percent of its gross
domestic product on environmental controls, as opposed to about 2.7
percent in the United States and in Germany. You can understand what
that does to the price of goods if you are going to put that much capital
investment and continuing costs into environmental control. Italy has an
advantage if it can take the extra 2.5 percent and put it in its own pockets
or if it can sell its goods on the world market for that much less because
it does not have to invest in the environmental control infrastructure.
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You also have the other issue of who is paying the money and
spreading it around. There is a dramatic difference between, for exam-
ple, the United States, where the private/public mix is about 60/40, and
Germany, where the private/public mix is about 50/50. Going even fur-
ther, seventy percent of the money spent in France is public money, and
in Japan, the worst example, eighty-seven percent of the environmental
control money spent is public money; factories in those nations are not
paying money out of their own pockets. To the extent such nations
spread these policies across the economy as a whole, key industries that
do not have to pay for the costs of add-on environmental controls can sell
their products that much cheaper and can have a competitive advantage
in the marketplace.
There have been key developments affecting the economics within
the EC itself. There are many costs coming up, and they follow the gen-
eral scheme we have seen in the United States and Canada. There is a
comprehensive water law that is starting to have some teeth in it. There
is a comprehensive air law, as well as hazardous waste-type laws. A di-
rective has just been adopted by the EC that finally defines what hazard-
ous waste is. Until this year, we had twelve different definitions of what
"hazardous waste" was. Such differences create non-tariff trade barriers.
When one company can dispose of its waste in its country as a nonhaz-
ardous waste, and somebody else has to dispose of the same type of waste
at ten times the cost because it is classified as "hazardous" in its country,
this is a trade difference. In the country where the waste is classified
"hazardous", the waste may also travel to another Member State. The
country which classifies the waste as "nonhazardous" will become an
environmental dumping zone. That is exactly what was going on. That
distinction is being removed right now.
Another area where we see the question of economics is the use of
fiscal instruments to support environmental programs in a positive fash-
ion, much like the trading credits concept under the Clean Air Act.
There is, for example, a new directive being prepared by the EC commis-
sion on carbon dioxide taxes and trading of carbon dioxide costs, and if
people can eliminate those kinds of materials over a certain time period,
they will pay less tax and can make economic decisions about what those
things are going to cost. There is also a new EC directive being drafted
on packaging questions. The goal here is, within the next ten years, to
make ninety percent of the packaging waste recoverable and let people
make their own choices about how they are going to meet that standard.
There will be penalties and essentially tariffs for people who cannot meet
the standards, but it is an economic-based incentive program.
These fiscal instruments will have economic impacts in the United
States and Canada to the extent we want to be trading partners with the
EC. If your package is going to go over there and move within the EC,
you will have to meet EC packaging standards. Your boxes, materials
and wrappings are going to have to be recyclable; you will have to make
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arrangements so those materials are recyclable. If you cannot meet the
comprehensive standards, your goods will be essentially barred from
moving within the EC.
The U.S. computer company Hewlett-Packard provides a good ex-
ample of dealing with the packaging standard. Hewlett Packard has just
redesigned all of its packaging worldwide to make it easier to recycle in
Germany, which already has a law like this in place. Recycling is being
advanced to a corporate-wide concept, affecting the worldwide manage-
ment of Hewlett-Packard.
Similarly, laws are already in place in Germany requiring people to
make their products recyclable and take them back at the end of their
useful life. Therefore, if you want to sell a battery in Germany, and it
has a six-year useful life, part of the deal is that you have to take the
battery back when the battery is dead.
Volkswagen has gone one step further on a couple of new cars -
recyclable cars. At the end of the useful life of a car, Volkswagen takes
them back so they can break them apart, separate metals, plastics and
other materials and recycle them. It is part of their design process.
When these standards come into place, they will dramatically in-
crease the trade issues for U.S. and Canadian trading partners who want
to fall - will have to fall - within those standards to get their products
into the market.
There are some other, more subtle things going on in the EC. They
are currently working on an eco-label scheme where they want to have
consumer market forces judge whether products are accepted or not.
For people who are willing to audit their own facilities and then have a
board certify that they are an environmentally responsible company, they
will have a certification, a little "environment safe" label, that they can
put on their product. When people go into the store and see similar
products side by side, they can ask if they are willing to pay ten cents
more for the one that has the eco-label on it. You might think that most
people are callous in this regard, but about seventy-five percent of
Germans and about ninety percent of Danes have said they would pay
ten to fifteen percent more for a product with an eco-label on it, and
Danish and German companies are responding by going after that
rapidly.
There is also a directive moving through on environmental auditing
for manufacturing facilities. It too is a voluntary scheme, and it has had
the same kind of impact. If you comply with the program, you can ad-
vertise that you are one of these voluntary auditing facilities that meets
government standards, and you can thereby derive whatever public bene-
fit or marketplace benefit that is associated with that distinction.
State aid is also a big issue here. The EC has generally taken a very
dim view of state aids restoring the marketplace within the European
Community, but the environmental market is one example where it al-
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lows them. There was a recent decision in favor of a Belgium chemical
company, allowing it to get several million dollars in aid from the
Belgium Government and a property tax exemption to put in environ-
mental controls. So, you are going to see distortions occurring when
money is moving generally from the tax base and is spread evenly, and
when that money is directed to selected industries. If that chemical com-
pany can save one, two or three percent on the cost of its product in the
world marketplace, there is competitive disadvantage going on here.
The one thing that probably gives people the most heartburn is what
the EC is doing in terms of a Superfund-like program. There is a liability
for waste directive moving forward in the EC. The EC has done a couple
things differently than the United States, and that point was brought
home to me when I met with the same member of parliament who I
alluded to earlier. He said:
We think it is a good idea to clean up sites, but we drafted this direc-
tive, and the directive says there is not going to be any retroactive
liability. We are going to make it strict. We are going to make it joint
and several. We are going to make you have insurance to take care of
these things, but we are not going to make it retroactive, and we are
going to give you an absolute defense if you can get it in the gate of a
state-licensed facility. That is encouraging good behavior. It is pre-
dictable; you can get insurance for that kind of a thing. Insurance
costs a whole lot less than the uncertainty of the financial markets you
have created in the United States.
All I could say to him was, "You understand U.S. environmental law
very well." We know what we have done to our banking system here.
The Superfund program - the inability to get insurance, the unpredict-
ability of retroactive liability that goes back fifty or a hundred years -
could not be planned for. Whenever that spotlight of Superfund liability
lands on a particular company, it can be bankrupt and out of business,
and the jobs can be gone. Well, the EC is thinking a little bit more care-
fully to avoid doing that.
Enforcement will also make a big difference in what is going to hap-
pen in Europe. There is currently no big supernational environmental
agency. They are still talking about having one, but they are at a stale-
mate on where to locate it; France wants it in France, and other Member
States disagree. I can tell you that when it is created, it will no time soon
have the 14,000 employees that the United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency has, and it will not include a bevy of lawyers backing up
enforcement. The EC is a long way away from that.
I think you get a little insight into what is going to happen when you
look at the civil liability for waste directive. Within that law or directive,
the EC is creating direct citizen suit potential, and I think to avoid the
political uncertainty and difficulties of creating a supernational enforce-
ment mechanism, maybe they are going back to the early days of envi-
ronmental enforcement in the United States. They are encouraging
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citizens to go ahead and bring those actions directly against Member
States that will not implement the laws and against companies who have
liability under the laws they create. Once people get used to that litiga-
tion mode in Europe - it is not really seen as a very acceptable thing
right now - perhaps you can have enforcement at the EC level, but I
would not expect it any time soon.
In order to avoid significant distortions in this world marketplace,
and particularly between Europe and North America, we are going to
need an honest broker who speaks the language of both environmental
law and economics. I am not sure if that person exists - given my own
nature of not trusting economists any more than my economist brother
trusts lawyers - but I am reminded of the story of the Texas sheriff who
finally caught up with the Mexican bandit who had robbed several banks:
The sheriff, while holding the bandit at gunpoint, said, "Tell me where
you hid the money." The bandit replied, "No hablo Ingles." After a
while, this nice Texas lawyer walked up and asked, "You all got a
problem here?" The sheriff said, "I want to ask him where the money
is, and he only speaks Spanish, and I only speak English. We aren't
getting anywhere." The lawyer said, "Well, I think I can straighten
this out. I speak both languages." The lawyer translated the sheriff's
question, and the bandit said in Spanish that he was not going to tell.
The lawyer turned back to the sheriff and said, "He says he's not going
to tell you." The sheriff told the lawyer to ask the bandit whether he
sees his gun. The lawyer translated and said to the sheriff, "He says he
sees the gun." The sheriff said to ask him if he wants to die. The
lawyer asked the question, and the bandit responded in Spanish, "All
right, all right. I hid the money over by the well. It's all there, and
you can go get it." The lawyer turned to the sheriff and said, "He said
he's not afraid to die."
Hopefully, in balancing the delicate issues of global environmental
protection and international trade we can find a person to broker those
issues who is not out to line his own pockets like the sheriff.
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